Kazakhstan to Cut Off Russian Power Imports Completely by 2027

Kazakhstan is rapidly building its own power infrastructure and by next year, it plans to no longer need Russia’s electricity at all.

Kazakhstan Moves to End Russian Electricity Dependency

Kazakhstan is pushing hard to wean itself off Russian electricity and the country’s deputy energy minister says the goal of zero imports could become reality as early as 2027. The Central Asian nation is racing to commission a string of new domestic power projects that would make buying Russian electricity unnecessary. This latest announcement signals how decisively Astana is breaking away from its long-standing energy ties with Moscow.

Deputy Energy Minister Sungat Yessimkhanov laid out the timeline clearly. “If we commission all the planned energy facilities by the end of this year or the beginning of next year, then I think we will not be buying [electricity from Russia] at all in 2027,” he said.

A Shrinking Deficit But Not Gone Yet

Kazakhstan still has a gap to fill in the short term. The country expects a power shortfall of 1 billion to 1.2 billion kilowatt-hours this year down significantly from 2.1 billion kWh in 2024. For now, Russia still covers that gap through ongoing electricity imports. But officials are confident the deficit will shrink to zero once the planned generation projects come online.

Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov revealed in January that Kazakhstan was actively developing 81 energy projects carrying a combined capacity of 15.3 gigawatts and a total investment of more than 13 trillion tenge, or over $25 billion. A large portion of those projects are due for completion by early 2027.

Russia’s Export Market Crumbling on Multiple Fronts

This development hits Russia at a particularly painful moment. Kazakhstan accounted for roughly 60% of Russia’s total electricity exports in 2025 making it Moscow’s single largest buyer. Losing that market would deliver a serious blow to Russia’s energy revenue.

Russia’s situation is already worsening on another front exports to China, long considered Moscow’s anchor market, collapsed completely at the start of 2026. The cause was a combination of domestic power shortages in Russia’s Far East and growing Chinese self-sufficiency in energy. Russia’s state-controlled electricity exporter Inter RAO reported a modest 5.8% year-on-year rise in first-quarter exports but the bulk of those deliveries went only to Kazakhstan and Georgia, two of its last remaining buyers.

Kazakhstan Pushes Russian Companies Out of Big Projects

The energy divorce goes well beyond import figures. Kazakhstan has systematically sidelined Russian firms from major infrastructure contracts a shift that signals a deeper and more permanent realignment.

Kazakhstan dropped Russian participation in the construction of thermal power plants in Semey, Kokshetau and Ust-Kamenogorsk. The Kokshetau plant will now be built independently by Kazakhstan itself. The other two projects are moving forward through a Kazakh-Singaporean consortium involving state energy firm Samruk-Energo.

Russia had previously been expected to provide concessional 15-year financing worth $2.7 billion for those projects, with Inter RAO acting as the main contractor. That plan collapsed when the financing never came through.

Chinese Equipment Replaces Russian Technology

At the Ekibastuz GRES-2 power plant, Kazakhstan scrapped plans to use Russian turbines and generators for a third generating unit replacing them with equipment from China’s Harbin Electric International. The switch cut the project’s cost dramatically, from 650 billion tenge to under 400 billion tenge a saving of around $500 million. Here, too, Russia had been expected to provide concessional financing that never materialized.

Nuclear Power Contracts Also Go to China

The trend extends into nuclear energy as well. Kazakhstan last year awarded contracts for the construction of two nuclear power plants to China not Russia. First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar confirmed the decision, noting that feasibility studies and project documentation are currently being prepared. For Moscow, losing the nuclear contracts represents yet another strategic setback in a region it long considered part of its economic sphere of influence.